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1.  Introduction 
India's National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (NREGS), implementation of which 
started in 2006, based on the 2005 National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (Ministry of Law 
and Justice 2005), is probably the largest social safety net program in the world.  
Not  surprisingly  for  a  program  of  this  magnitude,  the  NREGS  has  been  controversial. 
Supporters point to high awareness of the program, participation rates, especially by females 
(>50%) that are significantly above those achieved by earlier programs, and anecdotal evidence 
highlighting that the program has contributed to decentralization, transparency of local political 
processes, and served as an important safety net (Khera and Nayak 2009; Drèze  and  Khera 
2009;    Jandu  2008).  Critics  point  to  the  program's  high  cost,  low  efficiency,  and  serious 
corruption (eg., Niehaus and Sukhtankar 2009). The facts that EGS job opportunities may be too 
limited to meet the demand at the start of the scheme and the fact that the daily wage of EGS is 
higher  than  the  market  wage  for  casual  labor  may  cause  leakage  of  the  scheme  fund  to 
unintended group. Furthermore, possible corruption in the implementation of the scheme makes 
it more difficult for EGS to actually reach its target group, up to the point where the intended 
benefits may not materialize at all. Therefore, empirical work on the targeting of EGS as well as 
impacts on EGS on participants will be desirable.  
This  paper  studies  the  targeting  of  NREGS  and  how  NREGS  affects  some  major  welfare 
indicators on its direct beneficiaries. We use the data from some 2,500 households in Andhra 
Pradesh (AP) who were surveyed in 2004 before NREGS had been conceived, in 2006 when 
implementation  had  just  started,  and  in  2008  when  NREGS  operated  state-wide.  These  are 
combined with detailed administrative data on NREGS roll-out and work records. Our empirical  
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results suggest that NREGS targets the poor. However, a higher propensity of participation for 
households playing a leadership role in the village points towards some influence of village 
leaders in allocation of work. A lower participation propensity for illiterate and female-headed 
households also suggests that awareness of the program or other constraints on the ability to 
supply labor continue to be relevant.  Our results  also  point towards significant  and positive 
impacts of NREGS participation on consumption expenditure, intake of energy and protein, and 
asset accumulation, which suggest the short term effects of NREGS on participating households 
were positive and greater than program cost.  
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes key features of NREGS and its 
implementation in Andhra Pradesh. Section 3 describes data source and summary statistics.  
Section 4 presents the results on program targeting. Section 5 presents estimation results of 
program impacts on poverty. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2.  Key Characteristics and Implementation of NREGS  
While building on earlier a long tradition of food for work schemes, NREGS goes beyond them 
in a number of important respects, namely (i) for the first time households are provided with a 
legal right to be employed up to 100 days a year per household and individuals are entitled to 
receive the wages if no work is made available to them within two weeks of an application; (ii) a 
minimum wage rate is set at the state level and contrary to what is practice in rural India, the 
same wage is paid to males and females, a feature which, together with the fact that amenities 
such as crèches have to be provided at worksites, is viewed to make NREGS contribute to female 
empowerment;  (iii)  payment  is  to  be  made  promptly  in  cash  or  into  bank  accounts,  thus  
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providing opportunities for linking the poor to the banking system; (iv) there is a heavy focus on 
irrigation, minor roads, and land improvement to boost returns to labor at the local level; and (v) 
implementation  is  decentralized  to  local  governments  (panchayats)  to  ensure  that  works 
undertaken  are  actually  productive  with  considerable  control  by  village  assemblies  (gram 
sabhas), social audits, and the ability to check employment records by each individual through a 
website, to minimize corruption. The program was rolled out in three phases, starting with the 
most backward districts, to achieve full national coverage in 2008. Quantitative accomplishments 
are impressive: As of Dec. 2009, NREGS supported a total of 42 million households who put in 
1.95 billion work days on 3.3 million projects.  
In Andhra Pradesh, NREGS was implemented by three phases: Thirteen districts started 
to have to access to NREGS in 2006 in Phase 1; Phase 2 of EGS involved six more districts in 
2007; The remaining three districts were covered in 2008 when Phase 3 started. According to the 
Operational Guidelines (Ministry of Rural Development 2008), in order to participate in EGS, 
qualified  households  need  apply  for  registration  to  the  local  Gram  Panchayat  (village 
government, GP thereafter) under the supervision of the GP chief executive (the Sarpanch). A 
register maintained at the GP will be sent to the Block Computer Centre (MCC) for entry of the 
wage seeking household information. The MCC allocates a Job card ID and a Job card will be 
generated for each household and handed over to the GP. The GP completes the job card by 
affixing the photograph of all adult members of the household and hands it over to the household. 
The job card should be delivered to households free of charge within 15 days of the application. 
Once the job card is issued, the household can indicates to GP how many days (<=100 days) and 
when he/she would like to work under EGS for the following year. Based on the demand of 
households  and  the  recommendations  from  Gram  Sabha  (village  meeting),  the  GP  writes  a  
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proposal on work plan and submits to the Intermediate Panchayat (block/mandal government) 
who is responsible to consolidate GP plans at the Block level into a Block Plan and submit to the 
District Panchayat (district government). The projects are sanctioned at the district level (Is this 
correct?) and the allocation of work among job seekers is mainly the responsibility of GPs.  
Following the work allocation, job card holders go to the work site and perform the work. A 
weekly Work Progress Report along with the Muster Roll prepared by the Para-worker (local 
contractors hired by the program) will be submitted to the Block MCC. At the MCC, attendance 
is captured from the submitted Muster Roll. The data is validated and stored in the database. 
Based on the reported progress of work and the number of person-days spent, payment to the 
workers is computed and a Wage List is generated. The generated wage list is then sent to the GP 
and the paying agency can be either the village Panchayat or Post Office, Post Office savings 
account or Bank account whichever is convenient to the wage seeker.  
To make sure that schemes are being implemented as planned, government of Andhra Pradesh 
has started the implementation of social audits since July 2006. All districts in Phase 1 had been 
covered by the end of 2008. The so-called social audits are the audits with active involvement of 
the  primary  stake  holders.  During  social  audits,  several  frauds  have  been  uncovered  and 
punished. For example, some EGS organizers have embezzled money by “creating fake muster 
rolls, inflated bills, exaggerated measurements, and non-existent works, all through bribes and 
cuts from wage seekers”. The total amount recovered is around Rs 2.50 cr so far. Furthermore, 
the government of Andhra Pradesh has made important EGS information available online so that 
it can be accessed by everyone at anytime. The increased transparency makes it easy to trace 
every participant and every payment under EGS thus increases the potential cost of corruption.  
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The transparency and publication of information significantly facilitates our analysis. 
3.  Data  
Our analysis is mainly based on a three-round household survey conducted in 2004, 2006 and 
2008,  respectively.  Five  districts  were  chosen  to  represent  all  the  state’s  macro-regions 
(Rayalaseema, Telangana, and Coastal AP). Villages were randomly selected in these districts, 
and then households in these villages. The household questionnaire which was complemented by 
questionnaires at village levels, consisted of male and female parts administered separately -and 
as far as possible simultaneously- to the main male or female person in the household, normally 
the head and spouse.
1. The survey covers about 4300 households in 480 villages. Out of the five 
sampled districts, three are Phase 1 districts (Kadapa, Warangal, and Nalgonda) that started to 
access EGS in 2006, one is Phase 2 district (Nellore) that started in 2007, and one is Phase 3 
district (Visakhapatnam) that started in 2008.  
The household survey provides information on important welfare indicators including 
consumption, nutritional intake, and assets. Consumption includes food and non-food 
consumption over the past 30 days and more lumpy items over the past year.
2 We compute the 
amount of calories and protein consumed by multiplying physical quantities of more than 30 
food items in the questionnaire’s consumption section each with their caloric and protein content 
based on the main reference for Indian foods (Gopalan et al. 2004).
3 Non-financial assets include 
                                                           
1 For example, information on health, consumption, and female empowerment, among others, was obtained from the 
female while information on agricultural production was obtained from the male. 
2 Although the survey instrument is less disaggregated than that used by the National Sample Survey (NSS), it 
follows the overall structure used there.  
3 For fruits or vegetables where the survey includes only aggregate spending, we use the 55
th round of the National 
Sample Survey (NSS) to derive the price and caloric content of a representative basket of these consumed in Andhra 
Pradesh.   
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consumer durables, productive, and livestock assets.
4 Throughout, consumption and asset are 
expressed in per capita terms based on adult equivalent measures.
5 We also have information on 
household demographics and poverty category. The poverty category is based on a census  the 
state’s 2001 “below poverty line” census which is routinely used to determine eligibility for 
government programs complemented by a large effort of “participatory identification of the 
poor” that added vulnerability and social exclusion to quantitative census indicators. Each 
household is assigned to one of the four categories:  the poorest of the poor (POP), poor, not so 
poor, or non-poor.
6 
     The other part of data we use are online administrative data which include job card 
information for each wage-seeking household, muster roll information (such as wage rate, total 
amount paid, total work days, etc) for each worker, and each EGS work completed or in 
progress. Table 1 summarizes the types of EGS work completed by 2006, 2007, and 2008 for 
each phase. Irrigation and land improvement are the two most common type of EGS work, which 
had been taken by 76% and 75% of all villages in Phase 1 districts by 2008. Only 20% villages 
had taken road construction by 2008 in Phase 1 districts.  
     The third round of the household survey includes information on job card number for each 
                                                           
4 Financial assets were excluded due to concerns about misreporting. Asset values were measured as in December 
2003 in the 2004 survey, in June 2006 in the 2006 survey, and in XXX in the 2008 survey. 
5 The adult equivalent measures for caloric and protein consumption are obtained using nutritional requirements by 
sex and age as weights, i.e., weights are 1.2 for adult males, 0.9 for adult females, 1.0 for adolescents (12 to 21 
years), 0.8 for children aged 9 to 12, 0.7 for children aged 7 to 9, 0.6 for children aged 5 to 7, 0.5 for children aged 3 
to 5, and 0.4 for children younger than 3 (Gopalan et al. 2004). For income and overall consumption, we assign 
weights to be 0.78 for anyone older than 60 or younger than 14. 
6 The manual used in the process defines “POP” as those who can eat only when they get work and who lack shelter, 
proper clothing, respect in society, and cannot send their children to school; “The poor” have no land, live on daily 
wages, and need to send school going children to work in times of crisis. The “not so poor” have some land, proper 
shelter, send their children to public schools, are recognized in society, and have access to bank credit as well as 
public services. The non-poor, having land of at least 5 acres, no problem for food, shelter, clothing, can hire 
laborers, send children to private schools, use private hospitals, lend rather than borrow money, and have 
considerable social status.  
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household, based on which we merge the household survey data with the online administrative 
data. This allows us to learn about who worked under NREGS for how many days in our sample.  
Table 2 summarizes job card distribution and actual NREGS participation by household poverty 
category. By the end of 2008, about 53% POP households and 56% Poor households are job card 
holders, compared to 44% of Not-So-Poor households and 28% Non-Poor households in the 
Phase 1 districts.  This suggests the self-targeting mechanism of EGS takes effect. However, the 
actual participation rate of EGS (defined as having worked under EGS) is only 17.1% In Phase 1 
districts, 11.2% in Phase 2 district, and 4.7% in Phase 3 district by 2008.  
 
Table 3 summarizes household welfare indicators in Phase 1 districts by participation status in 
2004, 2006, and 2008 respectively. Participants refer to the households with at least one member 
who had worked under EGS by the end of 2008 when the third round survey was conducted. Not 
surprisingly, the participants of EGS had lower consumption, assets, and energy and protein 
intakes than non-participants in each of the three years.  
 
4.  Targeting of EGS  
As discussed earlier, being a direct beneficiary of EGS involves two steps: obtaining a job card 
and being assigned for work. Although we have no information on job card application, we can 
see from Table 1 that only a small percentage of job card holders have actually worked under 
EGS even for Phase 1 Districts. This observation suggests that the supply of EGS work cannot 
meet its demand so far, which is in line with our observation from the field visits. The summary 
statistics from Tables 1 and 3 both suggest that EGS participants are poorer than non-participants 
on average, which is in line with the self-targeting mechanism of EGS. To further examine the  
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targeting of EGS, we run a Logit regression of EGS participation in  Phase 1 districts.
7 The 
dependent  variable is  1 if the household  is  worked under EGS  and 0  otherwise. Household 
demographics  (location,  caste,  female  headship,  occupation  and  literacy),  leadership  in  the 
village,  and  initial  economic  conditions  (poverty  status,  consumption, nutritional  intake,  and 
non-financial assets) serve as explanatory variables. The summary statistics of the explanatory 
variables for participants and non-participants as well as the logit regression results are reported 
in Table 4. The pseudo R-squared is 5%, which suggests a relatively low explanatory power of 
the explanatory variables. This is expected because self-selection plays an important role in EGS 
participation.  
 
The results point to a higher propensity of participation for households being POP or Poor, 
having a member who is casual laborer, belonging to scheduled caste, being literate, headed by 
male, taking a leadership in the village, and having an initially lower consumption. The results 
confirm that EGS targets the poor. It is also intuitive that casual laborers are more likely to 
participate  because  of  the  nature  of  EGS  work.  That  literate  households  are  more  likely  to 
participate is in line with the fact that being literate can facilitate the process of job application 
because job seekers need to submit a written application of EGS work (Operational Guidelines 
2008). Female headed households are less likely to participate, probably because of the lack of 
labor. Households playing a leadership role in the village intend to participate, which may be due 
to two reasons: 1) socially active households are likely to apply for EGS work; 2) taking a 
leadership role may also favorably influence the allocation of work.  
 
                                                           
7 cluster at village level is used.  
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5.  Direct Impact of EGS on participants 
Although NREGS can have general equilibrium impacts through price and wage effects, this 
paper only investigates the direct impacts of EGS. For this purpose, we define our treatment 
group as the households with at least one member who participated in EGS work. The control 
group includes the households who live in EGS districts but did not work under EGS.  
  EGS participation is expected to contribute to higher consumption and asset 
accumulation of direct beneficiaries through three channels. First, EGS directly transfers 
financial resources to the participating households and increases household income, which would 
consequently increase total consumption and nutritional intake. Second, increased income 
encourages the poor households to save and invest, which could eventually help the poor to be 
involved in diverse productive activities. Third, most of EGS work takes the form of irrigation 
and land development and the work sites are often in the participants’ own fields. That is, 
participants may be paid for increasing the productivity of their own land. Increased productivity 
may lead to higher income and consumption.  
From Table 1, we learn that EGS work was clearly lagged behind in Phase 2 & 3 districts. 
Merely 25% villages have completed any projects by 2007 in the Phase 2 district and only 1% 
villages have completed a project by 2008 in  the Phase 3 district. We therefore expect that 
income generation through the third mechanism may not materialize by the time of our third 
round survey (2008) for households in the Phase 2 & Phase 3 districts. Accordingly, we redefine 
our treatment group as EGS participating households in Phase 1 districts. The control group 
includes the households who live in Phase 1 districts but did not work under EGS. In this section, 
we use both difference-in-difference (DID) and triple differences (DDD) to identify the direct 
impacts of EGS on participants.   
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5.1 Difference-in-Difference Estimation 
To illustrate our approach, let t=0,1,2 indicate year 2004, 2006, and 2008, respectively. Let 
1  it T  if a household i is treated at time t and  0  it T otherwise. Denote 
T
it Y as the outcome under 
treatment, 
C




i Y Y  . We 
are interested in the average effect of treatment on the treated (ATT),  ) 1 | ( 2 2 2   T Y Y E
C T , which 
is the expected difference between the actual outcome 
T Y2  and the counterfactual outcome 
C Y2  
for a treated household ( 1 2  T ). However, the counterfactual outcome 
C Y2  is inherently 
unobservable, which prevents us from estimating the ATT directly. The DID estimates 
) 0 | ( ) 1 | ( 2 1 2 2 1 2      T Y Y E T Y Y E provides an unbiased estimate of ATT conditional on the 
parallel trend assumption,  ) 0 | ( ) 1 | ( 2 1 2 2 1 2      T Y Y E T Y Y E
C . If we define the selection 




t t , the parallel trend assumption is equivalent 
to  2 1 B B  , or selection bias being constant in 2006 and 2008.  This condition will not hold if 
household characteristics or initial conditions affect subsequent changes of the outcome variables 
and have different distributions in the treatment and control groups. Combining the DID 
approach with propensity score matching (PSM) can address the bias due to observables and 
time-invariant unobservables but not time-variant unobservables. Having two rounds’ data 
before the intervention allows us to empirically test if the parallel trend assumption holds for 
2004 and 2006.  The null hypothesis is ) 0 | ( ) 1 | ( 2 0 1 2 0 1      T Y Y E T Y Y E , or  1 0 B B  .The 
rationale is, if we are confident that the selection bias is constant in 2004 and 2006, we can be 
confident that the selection bias is also constant in 2008.  
Table 5 reports the DID estimation results as well as the results combining DID with PSM  
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(see the appendix for details on PSM and the implementation), using 2006 and 2008 household 
data. The dependent variables are in both level and logarithm forms. The logarithm of the 
dependent variables indicates approximated percentage change of the outcomes. This 
transformation is more robust to location-specific inflation. However, it also changes the 
distribution of the outcome and gives poorer households higher weights in terms of the 
outcomes.  The regular DID results suggest a significant positive impact on all of the outcome 
variables. The DID plus PSM suggests positive however much lower impacts on consumption 
and nutritional intake. Since the reliability of the estimates depends on the assumption of parallel 
trend, we use the two rounds pre-intervention data to test the favorability of this assumption. The 
results presented in Table 6 reject the parallel trend assumption between 2004 and 2006. The 
regular DID results suggest that the growth of nutritional intakes is lower for EGS participants 
than non-participants before the program was in place, which holds even after matching and 
reweighting. The results, however, are not surprising given that self-selection plays an important 
role in EGS participation. Nevertheless, the results somehow suggest that DID may 
underestimate the actual program impacts and motivate the application of a triple differences 
(DDD) approach to be elaborated in the next subsection. 
 
5.2 Triple Differences Estimation 
The triple differences (DDD) estimator is to compute 
], 0 | ) ( ) [( ] 1 | ) ( ) [( 2 0 1 1 2 2 0 1 1 2           T Y Y Y Y E T Y Y Y Y E DDD
T  
which can be rewritten as  ). ( ) ( ] 1 | [ 0 1 1 2 2 2 B B B B T Y Y E DDD
C T        Therefore, the 
identification assumption of DDD is  0 1 1 2 B B B B     , i.e., the selection bias between period 1  
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and period 2 is equal to that between period 0 and period 1.  Different from the identification 
assumption of DID, we allow the subsequent change of the counterfactual outcome to differ 
between the treated and control households. Instead, we assume the difference of the subsequent 
change over the two periods to be identical between the treated and the control. We argue that 
this assumption is at least as good as the assumption for DID with parallel trend test passed. To 
see this point, we note that the assumption for the latter is that  1 0 B B   implies  2 1 B B  , which is 
an sufficient condition while not a necessary condition of the assumption of DDD. In other 
words, the DDD condition holds if the assumption for DID with parallel trend test passed is 
satisfied, and the DDD condition may hold even if the assumption of the latter does not hold. To 
account for the possible remaining bias due the interaction of observables and the difference of 
the subsequent change over the two periods, we combine DDD with PSM (see the appendix for 
details on PSM and the implementation.  
The DDD results are presented in Table 7. The results are mostly robust across estimation 
methods for both level and logarithm of the outcomes. The most robust results are on the energy 
and protein intakes which are positive and significant for both level and logarithm in each 
method. The estimated magnitude ranges from 162 to 233 Kcal per day per capita for energy 
intake and 2.7 to 3.4 gram per day per capita for protein intake. According to the results on the 
logarithm of energy and protein intakes, the estimated impact accounts for 4 to 7 percent and 3 to 
5 percent, respectively.   Concerning total consumption expenditure per capita, both DDD plus 
PSM methods detect a positive and significant impact for level and logarithm. The simply DDD 
points to a significant and larger impact on logarithm though not on the level. The impact is 
estimated to be 900 to 1000 Rs per year and 9 to 11 percentage points, depending on method. 
The simply DDD suggests a significant and positive impact on the logarithm but not the level of  
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non-financial asset. Both DDD & PSM methods point to a significant and positive impact on the 
level of non-financial asset. Simple DDD and DDD & PSM2 also identify a positive impact on 
the logarithm of non-financial asset (about 8%).  
  Overall, we found large, significant impacts of EGS participation on virtually all 
outcomes across methods. The average total cash transfer to participating households through 
NREGS is 276 Rs per capita per year. The estimated consumption increase is significantly higher 
than the amount of direct transfer. This suggests that the participating households have perceived 
a higher permanent income, which may be due to two reasons. First, the households expect more 
EGS job opportunities in the future. Second, they may expect higher productivity as improved 
land quality and irrigation facilities.  
 
6.  Conclusions 
Exploring a three-year household panel data set, we examine the targeting of NREGS and how 
NREGS  affects  some  major  welfare  indicators  on  its  direct  beneficiaries.  The  participation 
regressions support the notion that that NREGS targets the poor. However, a higher propensity of 
participation  for  households  playing  a  leadership  role  in  the  village  points  towards  some 
influence of village leaders in allocation of work. A lower participation propensity for illiterate 
and female-headed households also suggests that awareness of the program or other constraints 
on the ability to supply labor continue to be relevant.  
The Results from triple differences (DDD) and propensity score matching (PSM) point 
towards significant and positive impacts of NREGS participation on consumption expenditure, 
intake  of  energy  and  protein,  and  asset  accumulation.  In  terms  of  magnitude,  the  estimated  
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impact on consumption expenditure exceeds the direct cash transfer from NREGS, suggesting 
that, on average, the program may have been successful in creating assets that boost returns to 
local labor and that a significant share of the inflow is saved. We conclude that the short term 
effects of NREGS on participating households were positive and greater than program cost.  
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The assumption underlying PS matching is that, conditional on observables, the outcome change 
if not treated is independent of the actual treatment, i.e.,  ] | ) [(
0
1
0 X D Y Y t t    . This has been 
shown to imply   )] ( | ) [(
0
1
0 X P D Y Y t t     where  ) (X P  is the propensity score, defined as 
) | 1 Pr( ) ( X D X P    which, by definition, takes a value between 0 and 1 (Rosenbaum and 
Rubin 1983). We use a PS-weighted regression method (Hirano et al. 2003) which recovers an 
estimate of the ATT as the parameter   in a weighted least square regression of the form  
, 1 , i i t i t i D Y Y                                                              (8) 
where i indexes household, and weights equal one for treated and  )] ( ˆ 1 /[ ) ( ˆ Z P Z P   for non-
treated observations. See (Chen et al. 2007, van de Walle and Mu 2007) for empirical 
applications of this method. 
Moreover, to obtain consistent and efficient estimates, we determine the common support 
region by  
     ) ( ˆ | 10 X P X A                                                         (9) 
 where  1     if  
, 1 |
) ( ˆ 1
1
2
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) ( ˆ , 1 |







E                                         (11) 
otherwise. It has been shown that under homoskedasticity this trimming method minimizes the 
variance of the estimated ATT (Crump et al. 2007). Our results are based on trimmed PS-
weighted DD throughout. We also report the results for the untrimmed simple DD to highlight 
that trimming and matching will be needed even if mandals were randomly selected.  
    
19 
 
Table 1: Summary of EGS work completed by year and phase, averaged over villages 
 
Phase 1  Phase 2  Phase 3 
Type of work  2006  2007  2008  2007  2008  2008 
Irrigation  0.24  0.60  0.76  0.13  0.46  0.01 
Land Improvement  0.18  0.61  0.75  0.15  0.37  0.00 
Road  0.04  0.12  0.20  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Other  0.17  0.54  0.62  0.00  0.02  0.00 




Table 2: Summary of actual EGS participation by household poverty status 
   Phase 1  Phase 2  Phase 3 
   2006  2007  2008  2007  2008  2008 
If holding a job card             
All households  0.431  0.482  0.494  0.321  0.352  0.372 
Poorest of Poor households  0.477  0.521  0.532  0.298  0.338  0.399 
Poor households  0.494  0.542  0.557  0.417  0.457  0.462 
Not So Poor households  0.358  0.427  0.436  0.262  0.279  0.246 
Not Poor households  0.211  0.266  0.275  0.247  0.250  0.108 
If participated in EGS work             
All households  0.094  0.149  0.171  0.099  0.112  0.047 
Poorest of Poor households   0.088  0.165  0.182  0.102  0.111  0.070 
Poor households   0.111  0.171  0.201  0.131  0.139  0.042 
Not So Poor households  0.093  0.122  0.141  0.073  0.095  0.024 
Not Poor households  0.060  0.073  0.106  0.048  0.071  0.000 
Total amount transferred from EGS for participating households (Rs per household) 
All households  2249  2439  2590  2093  2005  936 
Poorest of Poor households   2074  2470  2611  2200  1910  788 
Poor households   2167  2478  2700  2130  2068  1188 
Not So Poor households  2485  2246  2402  1807  2108  1059 
Not Poor households  2926  2633  2351  1870  1902   
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Table 3: Household outcomes by participation status, over year 
 
2004  2006  2008 
 
Non-
Parti  Parti 
Non-
Parti  Parti 
Non-
Parti  Parti 
Consumption p.c. (Rs/year)  10141  9118  9685  8424  13312  12809 
Energy intake p.c. (Kcal/day)  2028  1993  2411  2217  2524  2442 
Protein intake p.c. (g/day)  45.37  44.04  49.44  46.16  53.04  51.62 
Total non-financial asset p.c. 
(Rs/year)  4192  3013  4319  3223  6635  5720 
Number of households  1610  743  1632  748  1686  755 
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Table 4:  Summary statistics and logit regression of EGS participation, using 2006 data 
  Parti  Non-parti  Logit Regression  
  Mean  SD  Mean  SD  Coeff.  SE  Sig. 
Household lives in hamlet  0.344  0.475  0.349  0.477  -0.019  0.099   
Household is POP  0.416  0.493  0.384  0.487  0.217  0.129  * 
Household is Poor  0.341  0.474  0.273  0.445  0.387  0.130  *** 
someone's primary occupation is 
casual labor 
0.742  0.438  0.589  0.492  0.509  0.111  *** 
Household is SC  0.341  0.474  0.235  0.424  0.212  0.116  * 
Household is ST  0.083  0.276  0.077  0.266  0.011  0.182   
Household is OC  0.146  0.353  0.238  0.426  -0.011  0.144   
Somebody can write  0.826  0.379  0.760  0.427  0.333  0.131  ** 
Household size  4.380  1.570  4.051  1.808  0.047  0.032   
Head female  0.074  0.261  0.119  0.324  -0.511  0.171  *** 
Someone being a leader in village 
committees or SHGs 
0.132  0.338  0.104  0.305  0.290  0.144  ** 
Consumption p.c. (Rs/year)  8424  3761  9685  4952  0.000  0.000  ** 
Energy intake p.c. (Kcal/day)  2217  772  2411  855  0.000  0.000   
Protein intake p.c. (g/day)  46.16  15  49.44  17  0.000  0.000   
Total non-financial asset p.c. (Rs/year)  3223  7359  4319  8231  0.006  0.009   
District dummies and constant  Not reported 
Log-likelihood          -1344.50 
Pseudo R
2          0.0534 
 




Table 5: Difference-in-Difference results using 2006 & 2008 data 
 
Variable  DD  SE 
 
DD+PSM1  SE 
 
DD+PSM2  SE 
  Consumption p.c. (Rs/year)  687  276  **  246  58  ***  339  58  *** 
Energy intake p.c. (Kcal/day)  82  22  ***  25  30 
 
31  26 
  Protein intake p.c. (g/day)  1.58  0.16  ***  0.72  0.41  *  0.84  0.28  *** 
Total non-financial asset p.c. 
(Rs/year)  45  196 
 
85  336 
 
91  283 
  Log of consumption p.c. 
(Rs/year)  0.089  0.020  ***  0.025  0.027 
 
0.046  0.017  *** 
Log of energy intake p.c. 
(Kcal/day)  0.021  0.005  ***  0.000  0.013 
 
0.007  0.007 
  Log of protein intake p.c. 
(g/day)  0.018  0.003  ***  0.001  0.012 
 
0.007  0.006 
  Log of total non-financial asset 
p.c. (Rs/year)  0.153  0.032  ***  0.037  0.038 
 
0.087  0.051  * 
Number of observations  755  1686 
 
736  1572 
 
736  1572 
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Table 6: Test results for the assumption of parallel trend using 2004 & 2006 data 
 
Variable  DD  SE 
 
DD+PSM1  SE 
 
DD+PSM2  SE 
  Consumption p.c. (Rs/year)  -204  233 
 
-336  214 
 
-359  220 
  Energy intake p.c. (Kcal/day)  -155  43  ***  -85  42  **  -98  40  ** 
Protein intake p.c. (g/day)  -1.83  0.86  **  -0.90  0.87 
 
-1.14  0.85 
  Total non-financial asset p.c. 
(Rs/year)  120  343 
 
-114  299 
 
-114  284 
  Log consumption p.c. (Rs/year)  -0.023  0.023 
 
-0.031  0.023 
 
-0.031  0.023 
  Log energy intake p.c. 
(Kcal/day)  -0.052  0.022  **  -0.017  0.023 
 
-0.025  0.022 
  Log protein intake p.c. (g/day)  -0.032  0.020 
 
-0.015  0.021 
 
-0.020  0.021 
  Log total non-financial asset 
p.c. (Rs/year)  0.069  0.073 
 
-0.017  0.076 
 
-0.007  0.082 
  Number of observations  748  1632 
 
735  1577 
 
735  1577 
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Table 7:  TD results using 2004, 2006, and 2008 data 
 
Variable  TD  SE     TD+PSM1  SE     TD+PSM2  SE    
Consumption p.c. (Rs/year)  971  635 
 
914  286  ***  967  309  *** 
Energy intake p.c. (Kcal/day)  233  23  ***  162  9  ***  173  13  *** 
Protein intake p.c. (g/day)  3.36  0.50  ***  2.66  0.28  ***  2.85  0.25  *** 
Total non-financial asset p.c. 
(Rs/year)  -15  380 
 
350  80  ***  348  92  *** 
Log of consumption p.c. 
(Rs/year)  0.112  0.047  **  0.087  0.029  ***  0.093  0.025  *** 
Log of energy intake p.c. 
(Kcal/day)  0.072  0.032  **  0.035  0.021  *  0.044  0.016  *** 
Log of protein intake p.c. 
(g/day)  0.048  0.021  **  0.031  0.015  **  0.036  0.012  *** 
Log of total non-financial asset 
p.c. (Rs/year)  0.081  0.044  *  0.056  0.063 
 
0.075  0.045  * 
Number of observations  755  1686 
 
736  1572 
 
736  1572 
   